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III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Unfortunately, Appellant in the second paragraph of her
Statement of the Case and throughout her brief raises issues
foreclosed ln this appeal by the Supreme Court's Order entered
November 2, 2011 granting Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
Appellant's Issues 3(d) and 3(e) of her Notice of Appeal 1 •

Susan

abandoned her appeal from the denial of her Motion for
Clarification. Appellant's Brief, p. 8.

Nor does the Record

support Susan's allegation on page 5 of Appellant's Brief that
"Susan has been deprived of approximately $460,000 of community
assets, while affording a windfall to Michael in the same
amount".

That allegation is not an issue in this appeal.

Appellant's current counsel is Susan's third attorney and she did
not try the case. R., p. 37. Susan also states that she filed a
timely appeal to the District Court, but the District Court ruled
otherwise. R. p. 1240. Because of other misstatements of fact and
omissions, out of caution, it is necessary to restate the
pertinent facts and history.

ssue 3 (d) read, "Whether the tfJagistrate erred in the Amended Judgment and
Decree of Divorce by including speculative tax consequences in its business
valuation". Issue 3(e) read, "Whether the Magistrate erred in the Order Re: Post Trial
Motions by failing to adjust the equali ation payment according to the actual tax
consequences". R. p. 1 5'7.
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Susan Vierstra filed a Complaint for Divorce on September
19, 2008, at a time when the dairy had already begun a sharp
decline because of market conditions.

Tr. Vol.

194, 205

I of II, p.

13, 2009)

(November 20,

2009); Tr. Vol.

III of III, p.
(October

Mike and Susan married on July 31, 1988, when Mike

was in the dairy business with his father. Tr. Vol.
5,

30 32

I of II, p.

(November 19, 2009). Vierstra Dairy started in 1992 and was a

sale proprietorship owned by the parties. Tr. Vol.
191,

(November 20,

2009).

since 2005. Tr. Vol.

III of III, p.

Susan was not active in the dairy

III of III, p. 191.

Trial over 5 days before Magistrate, Howard D. Smyser,
commenced on October 13 th and ended on November 24th, 2009.
Seventy-three (73)

exhibits were introduced and thirteen (13)

witnesses testified and after thorough post trial briefing the
court took the matter under advisement on December 7, 2009 and
issued its Memorandum Decision on January 7, 2010. R. p. 545. The
Judgment and Decree of Djvorce followed on January 25, 2010,
which started Susan's time for appeal. R. p. 597.
The Trial Court awarded Susan the first option right to
purchase the dairy at a value determined by Mike's witness,
Buckner Harris, C.P.A., who was more credible, and that value

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page

consisted of dairy land, the Blass crop farm,

feed lot, rolling

stock and the other assets and debts of Vierstra Dairy.
Memorandum Decision, R., p. 557 and 562.2 Susan filed on January
20, 2010, her Notice of Intent to Exercise her first option. R.,
p. 588. Susan could not obtain financing within sixty days of the
January 7, 2010 Memorandum Decision, which then triggered Mike's
option to buy the dairy. Mike timely filed on March 9, 2010, his
Notice of Intent to Exercise his option to purchase the dairy.
R., p. 864.

3

On February 8, 2010, Susan filed on the fourteenth day, an
Objection to the Form of the Judgment and Decree and her prior
trial attorney attempted to re-draft the Judgment and Decree
previously entered by the Court on January 25, 2011. R., p.
The next day,

630.

February 9, 2010, Susan filed an untimely (by one

day) Motion for Reconsideration on issues not germane to this
appeal. R., p.

649. On March 25, 2010, Susan finally lodged a

2 The Magistrate found,
based on the evidence that the more credible evidence
favored adopting Mike's witness, David McKinley's appraisal and Buckner Harris
C.P.A.'s bus ness valuation of Vierstra Dairy. R., p. 562, Memorandum Decision. The
court did not accept Susan's expert real
taLe appraiser, Joe Dunlap's value, or
C.P.A. Todd Wadsworth's business valua ion of Vierstra Dairy. R., p.
. Mr.
Sf
value of Vierstra Dairy was $1,058,53 , whereas Mr. Wadswo th found a value of
$4,887,767. R., p. 557, Memorandum Decision.

3 Mike was able
to obtain a loan from Citizens Bank and remove Susan's liability
from Dairy debt and pay he $3 8,896.63 from the loan to equa i e the community
estate. rz. p. 1003.
Susan accepted that sum, bringing
net es
te to
$1,212,306.63, but she is appealing, seeking $460,482 more. rz. p. 912.
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supporting Memorandum in support of her Objection to the Form of
the Judgment and Decree. R., p. 889.

The Amended Judgment

entered on April 29, 2010, altered the paragraphs in Exhibit 630
attached to the original Judgment regarding child support and
health insurance 4 which were not issues on appeal to the District
Court or the Supreme Court. R., p.

988-989.

Magistrate Smyser on

April 27, 2010, after a hearing in open court, ruled that it
could not find anything that was inaccurate in the Judgment and
Decree of Divorce. Hearing Tr. April 27, 2010, p. 19. Judge
Smyser stated that the Decree mirrors what he said in his opinion
and the criticism of Susan's counsel was a matter of semantics.
Hearing Tr. April 27, 2010, p. 19.

The Amended Judgment entered

on April 29, 2010, contained the same language as appeared in the
original Judgment regarding the tax liability associated with
Vierstra Dairy. R., p. 1240.
~The court finds the tax consequence to be
incurred by Vierstra Dairy in 2009 is as is
shown on Exhibit 801(a).
The Court finds
that it is more likely than not that Vierstra

1 The changes were to the custody schedule and parenting plan,
Exhibit 630,
attached to the Decree, and deleted paragraph 0 regarding child support which was
inaccurate as it conflicted with the proper wording of child support in paragraphs 4
and 5 in the body of the Judgment which remained the same. The health insurance clause
for the children was deleted in Exhibit 630 in paragraph 11, as it a so was covered in
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Judgment and Decree which did not change. The Amended
Judgment removed said paragraphs from Exhibit 630 regarding child support and health
insurance attached to the Decree. E., p. 988-989. ThE, Amendment corrected clerical
mistakes. R., p. 1141.
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Dairy will incur the tax consequence ... If no
tax consequence occurs, or if the tax
consequence is different from that shown in
Exhibit 801(a), the parties shall adjust the
valuations and equalizations accordingly.
If
necessary, the parties can petition the court
to address the adjustments."
The District Court ruled that since the Amended Judgment
contained the same language and determination that is set forth
in the original Judgment regarding the tax liability, that the
time for appeal on that issue began to run on the date of the
original Judgment.

R.,

p.

1240.

After Susan could not consummate her first option to buy the
dairy, Susan filed on April 23, 2010, a "Motion to Petition the
Court to Address Adjustments", seeking an adjustment to Judge
Smyser's valuation of Vierstra Dairy based on the amount of the
parties' 2009 income taxes. R., p.

921. Susan's Motion was

another attempt to convince the trial court to reconsider its
decision of the value of the dairy after considering the tax and
unless the trial court increased the equalization payment to her,
then she wanted Judge Smyser to order the dairy sold. Tr. Vol. II
of II, p. 151, May 12, 2010.

The Magistrate conducted an

evidentiary hearing on May 12, 2010, and denied Susan's Motion to
adjust the equalization payment for taxes,
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and memorialized the

same In the Order Re: Post Trial Motions, May 18, 2010, R., p.
1003. If the Dairy were sold Susan would receive less than if
Mike bought her out pursuant to the sum of $378,896 set by the
court in its Order entered on May 18, 2010, entitled "Order Re:
Post Trial Motions". R., p. 1003.

Susan had lived with the

court's decision until such time as she could not qualify to buy
the dairy, which prompted her Motion to Petition the Court to
Address Adjustments, wherein she urged yet again C.P.A.
Wadsworth's view of the tax amount. R., p. 588. Susan created an
untenable situation for Mike who was in the process of renewing
his operating loans and obtaining a new loan from Citizens Bank
to cash out Susan. Susan was threatening to obstruct the closing
and may not sign the deeds on the land securing the Citizen's
loan or remove her father's improper deed of trust on the land).
In addition, Susan demanded by way of an Affidavit filed April
23, 2010, an additional $460,482 at the closing. R., p. 912. That
obstruction prompted Mike's request for a hearing on May J2,
2010. R, p.

927-931, Hearing Tr. April 27, 2010, p.9-10.c

To obtain a release of her father's deed of trust Susan improperly demanded o[
Mike an additional $130,000. R., p. 880 and R., p. 929. Susan's obstruction
the
closing prompted Mike's Motion [or Emergency Ex Parte Relief. R. p. 880.
6 Mike made the Magistrate aware that Susan's tactic would prevenL
Lhe closing.
There were also further adjustments to reduce the original amoun due Susan that had
to be heard prior to the closing and Judge Smyser did not want to put off the hearing,
which was set for May 2, 2010.
Tr., p. 21, L. 6-7, April ?7, ?010. F. p. lOllI, 'JIl 3.
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Susan's Motion to Petition the Court to Address Adjustments
prompted Mike to respond by Affidavit and request a hearing so
that the loan could close. R., p.

927.

Susan filed her Notice of Appeal on June 10, 2010.

The

Notice of Appeal gave notice that Susan appealed from the Amended
Judgment and Decree of Divorce and the Order Re: Post Trial
Motions. The sole issue on appeal to the District Court was the
Magistrate's determination that was set forth in the original
Judgment regarding the tax liability in Vierstra Dairy. R., p.
1240. The case on appeal was assigned to experienced District
Judge Michael R. Crabtree, acting as an intermediate appellate
court pursuant to Rule 83(a),

I.R.C.P.,

and the District Court

sua sponte raised the issue that it lacked jurisdiction to

consider the appeal and directed supplemental briefing on
February 4, 2011. R. p. 1138.

Once final briefs were lodged, the

District Court issued its Memorandum Opinion on Appeal on June 9,
2011, dismissing Susan's appeal for lack of jurisdiction. R., p.
1236, 1244. Susan asked the District Court to reconsider in her
"Motion for Clarification" and the matter was heard on July 11,
2011.

The District Court entered its Order denying the Motion

for Clarification on July 13, 2011, and restated its ruling that
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(1)

it lacked the jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the

Amended Judgment in this case, dated April 29, 2010, and (2)

that

the Magistrate lacked the jurisdiction to conduct the post-trial
hearing and to enter paragraph 4 of the Order Re:

Post Trial

Motions dated May 18, 2010, regarding the tax liability and
valuation of Vierstra Dairy. R., p. 1253. Accordingly, the Appeal
was dismissed and the case was not remanded for further
proceedings because no further action was required by the
Magistrate in that regard.

R., p. 1253, Order Den

ng Motion for

Clarification! .
Susan alleges in her brief that instead of enforcing its
previous Judgments and automatically adjusting the value of
Vierstra Dairy, the Magistrate reopened the issue and received
additional testimony on the subject on May 12, 2010, and then
held that some tax would corne due over the next several years,
although it was without proof of the $1,006,000 tax liability
amount. Appellant's Brief, p.

6.

Susan alleges that the effect

, The Uistrict Court found that Appellant did not cite to any
atute, rule or
case law permitting a "motion for clarification" after a cas has been decided on
appeal.
The District Court ruled that aft
an appeal
decided, a Uis riet Court,
in its appellate capacity, may consider a timely petition for rehearing.
.R.C.P.,
83(x),
.A.R. 42.
Further the District Court held that a "Motion for Reconsideration"
after an appeal
s decided may be treated as a Petition for Rehearing under the Idaho
Appellate Rules, citing Di.eziger v. P.ickering, 122 Idaho 78,838 P.2d 321 (Idaho App.
1992), however, there is no appellate rul that appears to permit a motion for
clarification after an appeal is decided. R., p. 1254.
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of this Order was to reverse and modify the Magistrate's previous
finding requiring what she labeled as a so-called "automatic
adjustment". Appellant's Brief, p. 7. The foregoing statements
were inaccurate. First and foremost,

the Magistrate did not

change the decision at all and the $1,006,000 tax amount remained
Second, the court denied Susan's Motion. R., p. 1003. 8

the same.

The following statements of fact by Susan are irrelevant for
purposes of this Appeal:
A.

"In 1987 before the parties' marriage Michael
declared bankruptcy".
Appellant's Brief, p. 9.

B.

"At the time of their marriage she invested her
separate funds and Susan's father also helped the
couple finance and expand the dairy." Appellant's
Brief, p. 9. Susan did not prove the loan from the
father nor trace her separate property at trial.
Her father did not testify.
IV.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND

Respondent requests his attorneys fees if he prevails as a
prevailing party pursuant to Rule S4 (e) (1),
I.A.R.,

and

.r

~.

§

12 121.

I.R.C.P., Rule 41,

The Appellant brought the appeal

, Judge Smyser also directed Susan to record the release of her father's deed of
trust (which she held until the very las minute) so that the loan would fund and
close. R., p. 1004.
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unreasonably or without foundation,
and now the Supreme Court,

in that the District Court,

lacked jurisdiction.

The Appellant fails to present any significant lssue on
appeal regarding a question of law, and the Supreme Court has not
been asked to establish any new legal standards or modify
existing ones. The focus of the case is on the application of
settled law to the issue of failure to timely appeal the
Judgment. The attempt in this appeal is to return and litigate
again the issue of the tax liability previously decided by the
Magistrate Court, which is res judicata.

Accordingly, the appeal

should be deemed unreasonable and Respondent should be awarded
his attorneys fees incurred on this appeal.
127 Idaho 77, 896 P.2d 985
Idaho 53,

44 P.3d 1108

(Idaho App.

Huerta v. Huerta,

1995); Reed v. Reed,

137

(2002).

V.
ARGUMENT
A.

On appeal of a decision rendered by a District Court, acting
in its appellate capacity,

the Supreme will directly review the

District Court's decision to determine whether it correctly
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decided the issues presented to it on appeal.
149 Idaho 171, 233 P.3d 102 (2010);

Borley v. Smith,

Idaho Dept. of Health and

Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 219 P.3d 448

(2009).

Given the course correction in Losser v. Bradstreet, 145
Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758
of In Re Daniel W.,

(2008),

referred to as such in the case

145 Idaho 677, 183 P.3d 765 (2008), rather

than reviewing the Magistrate Court's decision independently of,
but with due regard for the District Court's decision, the
Supreme Court now directly reviews the District Court's decision.
Thus, the Supreme Court considers whether the District Court
committed error.

In Re Daniel W., p. 679.

9

The interpretation of an Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure is a
question of law over which the Supreme Court exercises free
review. Dawson v. Cheyovich Fami
699 (2010); also see by analogy:

Trust r 149 Idaho 375, 234 p.3d
In Re Daniel W.,

supra, applying

the same standard of free review to a Statute.
The Supreme Court will review freely conclusions of law
reached, by stating legal ru es or principles and applying them
9 Given the "course correetion
it would seem logica that the Supreme Court
would still give "due regard to the Dist iet Court's analysis U of a rule of law and
the application of jurisdictional facts as found by the District Court.
See: Roe
Family Services v. Doe, 139 Idaho 930, BB P.3d 749 (2004); McNelis v. McNelis, 119
Idaho 349,806 P.2d 442 ( 99 ); Harney v. Weatherby, 116 Idaho 904,'181 P.2d 241
(Ct. App. 1989). This is in keeping with the siqnificant purpose of the District
Court's role as an intermediate appellate court.
Rule 83(b), I.R.C.P.
U

,
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Liebelt v. Liebelt, 118 Idaho 845, 801 P.2d 52

to facts found.
(Ct. App. 1990).
facts as found,

If the law has been properly applied to the
the Judgment will be upheld on appeal.

Stonecipher v. Stonecipher,

131 Idaho 731,

See

963 P.2d 1168

(1998).

In that regard the Supreme Court reviews questions of law freely.

Matter of Estate of Wagner,

126 Idaho 848, 893 P.2d 211

(1995).

The Appellate Court may raise a question of subject matter
jurisdiction sua sponte at any time.

T.J.T.,

Inc.

v. Mori,

148

Idaho 825, 230 P.3d 435

(2010); also see State v.

Idaho 610, 226 P.3d 552

(Ct. App. 2010); and In Re: Quesnell

Dairy, 143 Idaho 691,

693, 152 p.3d 562,

564

Co.,

144 Idaho 751,

755,

148

(2007). The timely

filing of a Notice of Appeal is jurisdictional.

Life Ins.

Peterson,

In Re Universal

171 P.3d 242, 246

(2007).

Jurisdictional issues are questions of law over which this court
exercises free review.

T.J.T., Inc., v. Mori, supra, p. 827

(citing Christian v. Mason,

148 Idaho 149, 151, 219 P.3d 473,

475

(2009)). An appellate court cannot address the merits of an
appeal that is determined to be untimely.

Walton, Inc.

v.

Jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 979 P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1999).
While Susan discusses that the standard of review concerning
the disposition of community property is reviewed under the abuse
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of discretion standard (Chandler v. Chandler,
P.3d 140

136 Idaho 246, 32

(2001), the award of the dairy and value are not issues

in this appeal. While the substantial evidence test may apply to
the facts found,

it is not the evidence found by the Magistrate

that is involved in this appeal either. Susan consistently
ignores throughout her brief that the validity of the
Magistrate's finding of the value of Vierstra Dairy and the tax
consequence is not an issue in this appeal.

Order Granting

Motion to Dismiss Appellant's Issues 3D and 3E, entered by the
Supreme Court on November 2, 2011.
The Property Division portions of the Decree of Divorce are
"final, res judicata and no jurisdiction exists to modify
property provisions of a Decree of Divorce".

McBride v. McBride,

112 Idaho 959, 739 P.2d 258(1987); Ratkowski v. Ratkowski, 115
Idaho 692, 769 P.2d 569

(1989), cited by Appellant.
B.

THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED
JANUARY 25, 2010 WAS THE FINAL JUDGMENT FROM
WHICH SUSAN SHOULD HAVE APPEALED AND HER
FAILURE TO TIMELY APPEAL DIVESTED THE
DISTRICT COURT OF JURISDICTION.
Susan's first argument on appeal is that the District Court
should not have dismissed her appeal from the Order Re:
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Post

Trial Motions entered by the Magistrate on May 18, 2010.

10

However, this is the tail end of the jurisdiction question that
first must begin with Susan's untimely appeal from the Judgment
and Decree entered January 25, 2010. R., p.

597.

So as not to

produce so much unnecessary banter, Susan should have addressed
her argument in Part C (1) (2)

of her Brief first,

since the

repeated attempt to attack the tax ruling fails for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Judgment and Decree of Divorce entered January 25, 2010,
memorialized the Memorandum Decision issued January 7, 2010 and
was the Final Judgment.

I.R.C.P.

Rule 54 (a)

states "A judgment is

final if either it has been certified as final pursuant to
subsection (b) (1)

of this rule or judgment has been entered on

all claims for relief, except costs and fees".
Weatherby,

116 Idaho 904,

781 P.2d 241

In Harney v.

(Ct. App. 1989), the Idaho

Court of Appeals found the District Court's approach was flawed
when it held that the Magistrate's written decision did not
qualify as a judgment under I.R.C.P. Rule 54(a) because the

10
Appellant comrnences her argumenL that the Dist
ct CourL has
u isdiction by
returning to the Finding of Fac
recited in Lhe Judgment which fixed the value of
Vierstra Dairy after consideration at Lax.
Memorandum Decis
,R. p. ~63, Judgment
and Decree of Divorce; n., p. 602, J\mended ,Judgment and Decree of Divorce, R., p. 962.
That initial finding did not change in the Amended Judgment or in the Order [-(e: Post
Trial Motions entered May 18, 2010, paragraph 4, R. p. 1003.
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decision was not a final judgment.

The Court of Appeals

explained that there was no basis that the Magistrate's decision
was not a final judgment, under I.R.C.P. 83(a) (1)
were no "other issues that remained to be liti
supra at p.
language of

because there
ed". Harney,

907-908. Following the Harney analysis and the plain
54(a), the Judgment and Decree of Divorce

I.R.C.P.

entered January 25, 2010 was the final judgment since the
judgment was

entered as to "all claims for relief" and there

were no "other issues" that remained to be litiga ed.
In this case, the Judgment and Decree of Divorce resolved
all claims for relief,

including the division and valuation of

community property, the tax consequences in Vierstra dairy,
confirmation of separate property, child custody and child
support. Susan's argument that the Judgment and Decree of Divorce
was not final is belied by her actions. Susan did not dispute the
finality of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce; rather she relied
upon the same and accepted the Magistrate's valuation of Vierstra
Dairy at Mr. Harris'

lower value rather than what her accountant

Mr. Wadsworth concluded, as evidenced by her Intent to Exercise
Option to purchase the dairy at that value. R., p. 588.
Additionally, Susan's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's
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The disposition of the Vierstra Dairy tax liability issue
was not appealable separate from the disposition of that issue in
the original Judgment. R., p. 1240.

This is so because the

Amended Judgment did not change in any way that particular
disposition in the original Judgment and the time for appeal of
that disposition issue began on the date of the original
Judgment. State v.
(Ct. App. 1996)
P.3d 958

(2010)

Payan, 128 Idaho 866,

867,

Also see, State v. Ciccone,

920 P.2d 82,

83

150 Idaho 305, 246

The foregoing ruling by the District Court was

correct and there is no error to be found in applying the law.

Idaho Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 148 Idaho 124, 219
P.3d 448; In Re Daniel W., 145 Idaho 677, 183 P.3d 765 (2008)
As can be seen from Mike's Statement of the Case at p. 4,

the

only aspect of the Amended Judgment that differed from the
original Judgment were clerical deletions from Exhibit 630 that
inadvertently conflicted with the body of the Judgment regarding
child support and health insurance for the children, but in no
way were those issues connected with the disposition and va ue of
Vierstra Dairy.:

" By deleting clerica mistakes in Exhibit 630 the child suppo
amount and
health insurance responsibility remained exactly as was stated in the body of the
,Judgment.
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Since Susan's objection did not suspend the time for appeal
from the original Judgment and the Amended Judgment is not
separately appealable on the tax liability issue,

Susan's appeal

is untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction to consider it. R.,
p.

1240.
C.
SUSAN'S OBJECTION TO THE FORM OF THE JUDGMENT
AND DECREE OF DIVORCE DID NOT SUSPEND OR TOLL
THE TIME PERIOD FOR FILING HER APPEAL OF THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE UNDER I.R.C.P. 83(e) or
I.A.R. 14.

I.R.C.P.

83(e) provides:

"The time for appe
from a final judgment is suspended
by ... (2) a timely motion to amend or make additional
findings of fact or conclusions of law, whether or not
alteration of the judgment is required if the motion is
granted,
(3) a timely motion to alter or amend the
judgment
(except motions under Rule 60 or motions
regarding costs and attorney fees); ... and the fulJ time
for appeal from such a final judgment commences to run
and is to be computed from the date of the clerk's filing
stamp on any order granting or denying any of the above
motions.

I.A.R.

14(a) similarly provides:

" ... The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or
order in an action is terminated by the filing of a
timely motion which,
if granted,
could affect any
findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment in
the action (exc
motions under Rule 60 of the Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure or motions regarding costs or
attorneys fees), in which case the appeal period for all
judgments or orders commences to run upon the date of the
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF -
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clerk's
filing
motion ... "

stamp

on

the

order

deciding

such

The civil motions set forth in Rule 83(e), I.R.C.P. and I.A.R.
14

which

(a)

timely

suspend or

motions

under

terminate
I.R. C. P.

reconsideration under I.R.C.P.
I.R.C.P 52 (b)

time

59(e),

11(a) (2) (B),

for

appeal

timely

include

motions

for

timely motions under

to amend findings or conclusions or make additional

findings and conclusions,
I. R. C. P.

the

59 (b).

or a timely motion for new trial under

Each of the motions above requires that they be

filed no later than 14 days after entry of the final jUdgment. See
I.R.C.P 11(a) (2) (B),

State v. Ferguson,

I.R.C.P 52(b), I.R.C.P. 59(b), I.R.C.P. 59(e).

138 Idaho 659,

67 P.3d 1271

(Ct. App. 2002).

Plaintiff's Objection to the Form of the Judgment and Decree
of Divorce was not a motion contemplated under I.R.C.P.
I.A.R.

14 (a).

83 (e)

or

The Objection did not reference a rule or statute

under which it was made.

The objection was not filed pursuant to

any explicitly stated Rule of Procedure. R., p. 1238.

The time for

filing appea , as provided in I.A.R. 14 (a) is terminated only by
motions

State v.

cognizable

Nelson,

under Civil

104

Idaho

430,

or Criminal
659

P.2d 783

Nowhere in Susan's "Objection" or Memorandum
"Motion" mentioned.

R., p.

630, R., p. 889.
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rules

of procedure.

(Ct.

App.

1983).

n Support is the word

In Harper v.

Harper,

122 Idaho 535,

835 P.2d 1346

(Ct. App.

1992), the Court of Appeals listed the various avenues for directly
attacking a divorce decree. "Once a divorce decree becomes final,
it is res judicata with respect to all issues which were or could
have been litigated." See Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 328, 333,
612 P.2d 1175, 1180

(1980). "However, there exist various avenues

for directly attacking a divorce decree.

For example, a party may

move the district court to amend the decree,

or for a new trial,

within fourteen days of the decree's entry. See I.R.C.P. 59(d) and
59(e). The decree is also subject to appeal within forty-two days.
I.C. § 13-201; I.A.R. 14(a)."

Harper v. Harper, supra, at pp. 536-

537.
Susan's
I.A.R

14(a)

objection was
or

I.R.C.P.

not

a

83(e) .

cognizable motion pursuant
Susan's

Objection,

even

to
if

considered a "Motion" did not seek to affect any findings of fact
or conclusions of law.

March

18,

2010,

Susan

From the period January 20,
sought

to

obtain

a

loan

2010 through
commi tmen t

to

purchase Vierstra dairy in accordance with the Judgment and Decree
of Divorce. It was not unti

she failed in that regard, that Susan

finally filed a Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Objection to
the Form of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce on March 25, 2010.
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R., p. 889. It would be expected then at that point, she would seek
to amend or alter the magistrate's findings or facts or conclusions
of law with respect to the value of Vierstra dairy. However,
Obj ection

did

not

seek

that

the

court

alter

the

valuation

her
of

Vierstra Dairy or make amended findings of fact and conclusions of
law. The reason is that on February 8,
the dairy at Mr.

Harris'

2010,

Susan wanted to buy

value which the court adopted,

much higher value of her expert witness,

Todd Wadsworth.

not the
R.,

p.

588. Her Objection only sought to make clerical corrections to the
Judgment and Decree of Divorce.
The District Court was obviously accurate in concluding that
corrections she sought to the Judgment and Decree of Divorce were
merely

clerical.

Nowhere

in

the

Memorandum

in

Support

of

Plaintiff's Objection to the Form of the Judgment and Decree of
Divorce does Susan contest or request changes to the findings of
fact or conclusion of law of the Magistrate. Susan's objection to
the final judgment sought to substitute her lawyer's draft of the
Judgment and to
•

•
•

strike "various statements of facts that for some
reason Defendant determined were important to include
in the final order"
strike "duplicated" separate orders
strike "unnecessary and redundant statements regarding
Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion that was dismissed"
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•

"quash the January 25, 2010 Judgment and decree and
replace it with Plaintiff's proposed Judgment and
Decree of Divorce".
R., p. 890.

Susan's Objection to only the "form" of the Judgment and not the
findings

of

fact

or

conclusions

d

not

suspend

the

time

for

appeal.
Even giving Susan the benefit of doubt
could be viewed as a "Motion",

that

her obj ection

it was then as the District court

concluded that an I.R.C.P 60(a) motion to correct clerical mistakes
does not toll the time for appeal.
The

District

Court

correctly

83(e), I.A.R.

I.R.C.P.

pointed

out

in

its

14(a).

Order

for

Supplemental Briefing that "the record does not reveal that any
motions were

filed which would suspend the

time

for

appeal ... "

(Order for Supplemental Briefing, R., p. 1141) and so concluded in
its Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, R., p. 1240.
Susan asserts that her Objection and Memorandum in Support,
"clearly"

implicates

the

provisions

of

I.A.R.

14(a).

Susan

incorrectly tells the court in her Brief that "the lengthy list of
obj ections to various

facts

with the objections to the

contained in the Judgment,

together

form of the Judgment and request to

quash the Judgment and replace it in its entirety, if granted would
have

affected any

findings

judgment in the action."

of

fact,

conclusions

of

Law or any

There was no mention in the Brief of what

"finding of fact" or "conclusion of law" she is talking about. Her

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 22

request

to

replace

the

judgment with her own was

recognized under I.R.C.P. 52 (b)

F

The

a

at tempt

to

replace

such

not

a

Motion

I.R.C.P. 59(b)F or I.R.C.P. 59(e).

judgment

with

her

own

version,

without altering or amending the findings of fact or conclusions of
law,

was not sufficient to "affect any judgment in the matter".

Rule 83(e),

I.R.C.P.

State v.

Payan,

supra; Rule 14 (a),

I .A.R.;

Walton Inc. v. Jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 979 P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1999).
The purpose behind I.A.R. 14(a) is not to allow a person to object
to excessive page length of the Judgment,
such request,

as Susan did,

and have

suspend the time for appeal on the findings of fact

and conclusion of law, to which she did not object. Objections to
semantics,

the

type

of

font,

size

of

letters,

or

failure

to

capitalize a word could not extend the time for appeal.
Susan relies on Walton

F

Inc.

v.

Jensen,

132 Idaho 716,

979

P.2d 118 (Ct. App. 1999) to support an argument that her objection
to the

Judgment

terminated the

time

for

filing

appeal.

Susan's

reliance on Walton is misplaced as the objections in Walton are
distinguishable from the Obj ection Susan filed in this case.

In

Wal ton, the Court determined that Wal ton breached his contract with
Jensen and required him to pay damages.

Both Walton and Jensen

filed objections to the District Court's factual determination of
damages.

Those

objections

were

to

the

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law of the District Court, not to the form of the
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judgment.

The Idaho Court of Appeals in Walton acknowledged that

"both parties filed motions objecting to portions of the judgment.
These Motions did extend the time to file appeal ... because they

could

have

law ... [and the]
Court

of

findings

affect [ed] ...

of

judgment in the action.

Appeals

concluded

that

after

fact,

conclusions

Id at p.

the

The Idaho

719.

order

of

denying

the

"motions" objecting to the damages, no further motions were pending
that could affect the damage award and that the appeal period ran
from

that

"Under

time.

I.A.R.

Significantly

in

14 the parties'

Wal ton

forty-two

appears
days

to

the

statement

file

an appeal

began running when the district court issued its order on November
4

because

moti_ons

that

order

contesting

was

the

a

final

district

conclusion of law." Id. at 719.

judgment

court's

which

findings

(emphasis added).

resolved

all

of

and

fact

Susan's reliance

on Walton to support her position that her objection started the
time

for

appeal

anew,

ignores

the

fact

her

obj ection

did

not

contest the Magistrate's "finding of fact and conclusion of law."
Walton at 719.

In this case,

the Judgment and Decree of Divorce

was the final order and no timely motion was filed contesting the
findings of fact and conclusion of law and thus time for appeal was
not tolled or started anew.
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Susan attempts to support her position that the time period
for appeal was terminated with the timely filing of an "objection"
by citing five cases, none which state that an "objection" starts
anew the period of the time for appeal. First, Susan cited Floyd v.
Board of Com'rs of Bonneville County,

863

137 Idaho 718, 723,

52 P.3d

(2002) which dealt with a reconsideration motion. Next, Susan

cited Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc. v. Burtenshaw, 122 Idaho
904,

907,

841

P.2d

Reconsideration.
690,

434

Next,

(1992),

which

dealt

with

Susan cited Thompson v.

a

Pike,

Motion

for

122 Idaho

694, 838 P.2d 293(1992), but it dealt with an I.R.C.P. 59(e)

motion to alter or amend. Susan cited Sinclair Marketing, Inc.

v.

Siepert, 107 Idaho 1000, 695 P.2d 385 (1985), which dealt with the

appeal period starting anew after the filing of any "timely postjudgment motion." Id at 1006. The Sinclair holding was broad and
provides little guidance.

I.R.C.P.

83(e) and I.A.R. 14(a) do not

state that "any timely post judgment motion" terminates the time
for appeal,

but only those that "affect the findings of fact and

conclusion of law or any judgment." See I.R.C.P.
14(a).

83(e) and I.A.R.

Lastly, Susan cites CecLI v. Gagnebin, 146 Idaho 714, 202

P.3d 1 (2009), in which the time for appeal was terminated from an
award of attorney's fees and costs, by the filing of "a motion to
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amend the amended judgment pursuant to Rule 59 (e)

of

the

Idaho

Rules of Civil Procedure." Id at 5. Susan did not file a Rule 59(e)
Motion in this case,
in Exhibit 630.

rather she sought to delete a clerical error

In determining whether a Motion is a Rule 59(e)

Motion, or a Rule 60 Motion, the substance of the Motion controls.
Ade v.

Batten,

126 Idaho 114, 115, 878 P.2d 813, 814 n.1 (Ct. App.

1994). Susan's Motion was not a Rule 59(e) Motion which sought to
correct legal and factual errors occurring in the proceeding, i.e.
the tax issue.

Straub v.

760

p.

(2007).

R.,

145 Idaho 65,

Smith,

71,

175 P.3d 754,

1239.

D.
THE AMENDED JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE
DID NOT CHANGE THE DISPOSITION OF THE
JUDGMENT AND DECREE OF DIVORCE; THE TIME FOR
APPEAL RAN FROM THE DATE THE JUDGMENT AND
DECREE OF DIVORCE WAS ENTERED.

In State v.
1996),

Payan,

128

Idaho 866,

920

P.2d 82

(Ct.

App

the Court of Appeals determined that the Di str ict Court's

Amendment to the Judgment of Conviction did not suspend or start
anew the time period for filing appeal.

In Payan,

a Judgment of

Conviction was entered and Payan untimely filed a notice of appea
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from said Judgment.

1.2

The District Court then entered an Amended

Judgment of Conviction adding a provision giving Payan credit for
time already served.

Payan argued that

when the

District Court

entered an Amended Judgment his notice of appeal became premature.
The Court stated
for

time

~the

amendment to the judgment only added credit

served and did not

otherwise

change

the

terms

of the

original judgment ... therefore, although an alteration was made to
the

judgment

of

conviction,

it

is

of

no

consequence

for

the

purposes of this appeal and will therefore not be interpreted to
toll the appeal period."

Id at

867.

The appellate rules do not

specifically provide that when the trial court adds language to a
judgment ... the addition commences the appeal period anew for all
purposes . .. If the district court had issued an
Payan credit for time served,

~order"

granting

that would not properly initiate a

new appeal period for any of the unaffected terms in the original
judgment.

Id at 867.

In applying

the

facts

in

Payan

to

this

case,

the Amended

Judgment and Decree only added paragraph 17 changing Susan's name
at her request and removed paragraphs 10 and 11 regarding child
support and health insurance from Exhibit

630 attached thereto,

" The logic in Payan, supra, applies equally to criminal or civil rules.
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leaving intact the child support and health insurance language in
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Decree, exactly as it was. Those changes
were

to

parties.
suspend

correct

clerical

Such deletions
the

time

for

mistakes

and

from Exhibit
appeal

from

were

stipulated

630 did not

the

Judgment

by

the

start anew or
and

Decree

of

Divorce, nor did the issuance of the Amended Judgment extend the
time

for

District

appeal.
Court

Because the

was

the

sole

Magistrate's

issue

in the

appeal

determination

of

to the

value

of

community property as affected by the income tax liability, and the
Amended Judgment and Decree of Divorce contained the same language
as the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, the time for appeal began to
run on the date of the original Judgment or January 25,

2010 and

thus Susan's appeal is untimely. R., p. 1240.
E.

SUSAN'S MOTION TO PETITION THE COURT TO
ADDRESS THE ADJUSTMENTS MADE EIGHTY-EIGHT
DAYS AFTER THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE, WAS NOT A
MOTION AUTHORIZED UNDER ANY STATUTE, RULE, OR
CASE LAW AND WAS NOT TIMELY.
On April 23,

2010,

88 days after the Judgment and Decree of

Divorce was entered, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Petition the Court
to Address Adjustments. A Motion to Petition the Court to Address
Adjustments is not one of the recognized motions that would extend
the time for filing appeal which lapsed on March 8, 2010.
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With reference to the assertion that

Plaintiff's Motion to

Petition the Court to Address Adjustments was filed pursuant to
I.R.C.P.

60(b),

that

Rule

was

not

cited

as

authority

for

the

Motion. So too, the Statement of Issues filed in the Appeal to the
District Court on June 24, 2010, did not identify the denial of a
1. R. C. P

60 (b)

motion.

R.,

p.

1018 1019.

Finally the

Notice of

Appeal to the District Court made no mention of I.R.C.P. 60(b). R.,
p. 1007.

Since

Plaintiff

is

barred from appealing

the

Judgment

and

Decree of Divorce because her appeal was not filed in time, she can
not

indirectly

appeal

the

decision

to

reconsider

the

tax

consequences, vis-a-vis, the denial of her Motion filed April 23,
2010.

The following issues on Appeal to the District Court were

time barred,

Issue A in Appellant's Statement of Issues, alleging

that the tax was speculative,

Issue B-the failure of the Court to

adjust according to actual tax consequences.
Motion filed April 23,
the

previous

ruling

R., p. 1019. Susan's

2010 was merely an attempt to re litigate

which

remained

the

same

regarding

the

tax

consequence, and the time for appeal had already lapsed on March 8,
2010 and as such was res judicata.
Susan's claim, that prior to the Order Re: Post Trial Motions
there was

nothing

for

her
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to appeal,

is

incorrect.

If

she

had

contested

any

of

the

Magistrate

Judge's

findings

of

fact

and

conclusions of law, as she does now for the very same reason that
failed

her

at

trial,

she

should

have

timely

filed

a

Motion

contesting those findings and conclusions or a Notice of Appeal,
and simply not have objected to the Form the Judgment and Decree
which mentioned none of the issues which were the subject of the
Appeal

to

the

District

Court

or

to

the

Supreme

Court.

Susan

accepted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding the
tax consequence until she failed to consummate her first right to
purchase the dairy. R., p. 588. Although she objected to the form
of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce,

only clerical objections

were made. The objection did not address any issues on Appeal. The
issues raised in this Appeal were litigated at trial and became
final when the appeal time lapsed on March 8, 2010.
F.

SUSAN'S APPEAL FROM THE ORDER RE: POST TRIAL
MOTIONS ALSO FAILS FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION.
The

District

Court

determined

pre iminarily

that

jurisdiction to consider an appeal from the Order Re:
Motions entered May 18, 2010.
May 18,
District

Rule 11(a) (7),

2010 was an Order made after final
Court

properly
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that

I.A.R.

had

Post Trial

The Order of

Judgment.

the

it

Yet,

Magistrate

the

lacked

jurisdiction to enter an Order Re: Post Trial Motions regarding the
Vierstra Dairy tax liability, namely paragraph 4.
Generally
Di vorce are

the

final,

property
.res

division

judi ca ta,

portions

and no

of

a

Decree

of

exis ts

to

j ur i sdiction

modify property divisions of a divorce decree. McB.ride v. McB.ride,
112 Idaho 959, 739 P.2d 258 (1987).
within fourteen
27, 2010,

days after entry of the Judgment on January

a Motion to Amend the Findings of the Court (Rule 52 (b) ,
to Alter or Amend the Judgment

I.R.C.P.),

seek

(14)

Susan failed to timely invoke

new

a

trial

(Rule

59 (b) ,

(Rule 59(e),

I.R.C.P.) ,

reconsideration, Rule 11(a) (2) (b), I.R.C.P.).
appeal by March 8, 2010.
835 P.2d 1346,

1347 48

Rule 83(e),

I.R.C.P.

Motion,

she

as

withdrew.

had

ask

or

Ha.rper v. Harpe.r, 122 Idaho 536,

(Ct.

App.

1992);

done

earlier

in

Rule 14 (a),

the

for

Nor did she timely

Nor did Susan file a Rule
case,

536-537,

I.A.R.;

60 (b)
but

and

I.R.C.P.

which

she

R., 488 and R. 592. The Distr ct Court properly followed

Harper and applied the
Welfa.re v.

I.R.C.P.),

Doe,

law correctly.

Idaho

148 Idaho 124, 219 P.3d 448

t.

Of Health

and

(2009).

An Amended Judgment contained the same paragraph as follows:
"The Court finds the tax consequence to be
incurred by Vierstra Dairy in 2009 as is shown
on Exhibit 801 (A). The Court finds that it is
more likely han not that Vierstra Dairy wi 1
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incur
the
tax
consequence ... I f
no
tax
consequence occurs, or if the tax consequence
is difference from that shown in Exhibit
801(A),
the
parties
shall
adjust
the
valuations and equalizations accordingly.
If
necessary, the parties can petition the court
to address the adjustments."
The last sentence did state,

that

if necessary the parties can

petition the court to address the adjustments.

To the extent the

language contemplated a procedure for post judgment modification of
the property division, it must be one that complies with a statute
or rule. R., p.
rule,

1242. The Magistrate did not refer to a specific

statute or case law that would avoid the finality and res

judicata

effect

of

a

final

Judgment

regarding

the

division

of

property and debt. R. 1242.
Susan's Motion to petition the court to address adjustments
filed on April 23, 2010, sought to adjust the income tax liability
based on the

2009

tax

year

filing.

Her Motion and supporting

Affidavit did not explicitly identify a statute, rule, or case law
that gave the Magistrate continuing jurisdiction to alter the final
Judgment.

R.

1242.

To save her from such omission in this appeal, Susan contends
her Motion was really a RuJe 60 (b) /
provides

several

grounds

for

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 32

relief

I. R.

C. P.

from

a

Motion.

RuJe

Judgment,

60 (b)

such

as

60 (b) (1),

(2),

(5) and (6).

Yet the party seeking relief pursuant

to Rule 60(b) must specify the particular grounds for relief from
the Judgment.
P.3d 1059, 1063
where

the

1242;

R.

(2003).

moving

circumstances".
234 P.2d 699, 704

Palmer v.

Dawson v.

a standard. See McBride,

138 Idaho 798,

802,

69

A Rule 60(b) Motion may only be granted

party

(2010)

Spain,

has

shown

"unique

and

Cheyovich Family Trust,

compelling

149 Idaho 375,

The principle of finality supports such
supra, at p.

963.

The determination of whether a Motion is a Rule 60(b) Motion
depends on its substance.

See Ade v.

878 P.2d 813,814, n.1 (Ct. App. 1994).

Batten,

R.1239.

126 Idaho 114, 116,
Susan's Affidavit

filed in support of her Motion to Petition the Court to address the
adjustments read as follows:
"The 2009 income taxes have been completed as
married filing separate which resulted in a
total payment of $85,376 ($42,790 and $42,586)
after the State refund of $340 ($170 for each)
for a net tax payment of $85,036.
This
payment included capital gains taxes due on
sale of animals.
Per the Memorandum and
Decision, this full amount is to be paid by
the
dairy
accounts/Mike.
The
d fference
between the tax and the reduction in value for
the tax liability is $920,964.
Accord ng to
our calculation, one half of this amount or
$460,482 is due to complete the equa ization
and tax adjustment."
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Initially it is noted that the Motion was not a Rule 60 (b)
Motion since it did not request relief from the Judgment which is
the purpose of a Rule 60(b)

Motion as is captured in the heading

and first sentence of the Rule.

R. 1243. Rather,

enforce the Decree and the language,
different

from that

"i f

shown on Exhibit

the tax consequence is

801 (A),

the

adjust the valuation and equalization accordingly.
Moreover,

Susan

did

not

label

or

Susan sought to

perceive

parties

shall

R. 602 and 962.
the

Motion

to

Petition the Court to Address Adjustments to be a Rule 60(b) Motion
or treat it as such.

R.

hearing on her Motion,

1243.
R.

1035,

Susan obj ected to an evidentiary
although she had the burden of

showing unique and compelling circumstances to persuade Mag strate

Smyser to grant a Rule 60(b) Motion.
p.

Susan sought to bar testimony from C.P.A.

6.

upon

Also see Appellant's Brief at

whom the

court

relied,

that

reducing the value of the dairy,
still correct. R. 948.13
101-104.

r., Vol.

explained why

Buckner Harris
the

tax

amount

now solely payable by Mike,

Tr., Vol. II of II, May 12,2010 hearing,

1, May 12, 2010, p.

The District Court correctly found,

67-68.
despite Susan'

that the substance of the Motion to Petition the Cour

urging,

to Address

~3
The $1,006,000 tax 1 ability became final in that Susan failed to timely
appeal. The T ial Court never changed that finding.
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Adjustments

was

not

a

Rule

60 (b)

Motion

that

provided

the

Magistrate jurisdiction to modify the Judgment. Therefore, as the
District Court held,

the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to enter

portions of the Order Re: Post Trial Motions regarding the Vierstra
tax liability.

The Court held that the Magistrate was without

jurisdiction to conduct the post trial hearing and enter paragraph
4 of the Order Re:
correct,

Post Trial Motions.

R.

1253.

The ruling was

in that the decision on the tax issue was final.

It is

established law in Idaho that the division of property and debt in
a

divorce decree

if not

appealed by the

parties

is

final,

res

judicata, and no jurisdiction exists to modify property provisions
of the Decree. McBride v. McBride,

supra.

Having the agreed upon valuation date for assets and debts of
October 13,
the

2009,

community

R.

assets

546,

574,

and

debts

the Court determined the value of
and disposition

thereof

in

the

Memorandum Decision from which there was no timely appeal. R. 545547.

The adjudjcation and assignment of the tax obligation to the

party who exercised the option to buy the dairy was res judicata.
Absent an agreed upon date,
entry of the decree.
P.3d 918
(Ct. App.

the date of valuation is the date of

Brinkmeyer v. Brinkmeyer,

(2001); McAffee v. McAffee,
1999);

and Desfosses v.
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135 Idaho 596, 21

132 Idaho 281,

Desfosses,

971 P.2d 734

120 Idaho 354,

815

P.2d 1094

(Ct.

App.

1991).

There is no provision or rule that

allows the court to avoid the finality of a Judgment by leaving the
door open to re-litigate the same issue again in futuro.

Mike, by

the Decree, must pay all the tax consequence of $1,006,000 since he
received the Dairy,

its debt,

and the tax.

Judge Smyser did not

change his ruling on May 18, 2010 concerning the tax issue. Susan
had litigated at great length during the trial her view contesting
the amount

and that

the

$1,006,000

amount was

speculative.

The

testimony of both accountants in the case consumed over 349 pages
of typed transcript
final,

testimony.

Once the

Divorce

Decree became

it was res judicata with respect to all issues which were

litigated.
Res
j udica ta)

Harper v. Harper,
judicata

is

supra.

comprised

and issue preclusion

of

claim

preclusion

(collateral estoppel)

(true

res

Under

the

principal of claim preclusion, a valid final judgment rendered on
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar
to a
claim.

subsequent
Lohma n v .

action between the

same

139 Idaho 312,

parties

upon

78 P.3d 379

the

same

(2003).1 4 The

.• The three fundamental purposes served by res judicata are: first it preserves
the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect tha
would follow if the same matter were twice litigated to inconsis ent results; second,
it serves the public interest of the courts against the burdens of repetitious
litigat on; and third, it advances the private interest in repose from the harassment
of repetitive cLaims.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - Page 36

doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent re-litigation
of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent re-litigation
of any claims

relating

to the

same

cause of action which were

actually made, or which might have been made.

Lohman, supra at p.

320. The District Court's rationale is sound, that Susan could not
return with a tardy Motion on April 23, 2010 to re-litigate a tax
amount that was decreed since it would destroy the finality of the
Judgment. McBride,

supra at p.

963.

The Stipulation by the parties fixing the valuation date as of
October 13, 2009 was binding,
925 P.2d 1121

(1996),

Ratliff v. Ratliff,

129 Idaho 422,

and it is on that date based on the best

evidence available that the tax amount was determined.

If Susan

ended up with the dairy she had to pay that amount, as Mike would
if he could consummate his option in the event Susan failed to do
so.
Looking for a way to characterize her Petition to the Court to
Address Adjustments,

since the Rule 60 (b)

attempt will not work,

Susan's brief to the Supreme Court characterizes the Motion as a
Motion to enforce the Judgment.

The District Court focused on the

tax language in the Decree that was not mandatory and read,

"if

necessary

the

the

parties

can
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petition

the

court

to

address

adjustments".

Nevertheless, the Decree was still final in fixing

the tax amount.

The Magistrate realized that property and debts at

divorce,

once valued,

are to be divided to give each spouse sole

and immediate control of his or her share of the estate.
Carr r 108 Idaho 684, 701 P.2d 304
p.

1142; Balderson v.

961

(1995).

Balderson,

Carr v.

(Ct. App. 1985). R., p. 545 and
127 Idaho 48,

53,

896 P.2d 956,

The Magistrate realized that is should not force the

sale of the dairy that Susan wanted if she did not get her way, as
it would create waste,
supra.

Carr,

with each party receiving less.

R. p. 545 and p. 1003.

Susan turns to Borley v.
(2010)

urging

that

there

supra,

Smith,

should

interpret the Decree her way.
McBride,

Carr v.

be

149 Idaho 171, 233 P.3d 102
a

remedy

in

this

case

to

First, she remarks that the court in

appeared to indicate that a party to a property

settlement agreement that

is

not merged in the

Decree may seek

court enforcement where the other party has failed to carry out the
terms of the agreement. McBride should not be read that way because
the court cannot enforce a non-merged Property Settlement Agreement

It is this ianguage, contrary to Susan's urging, that did not make for an
automatic adjustment as the parties may not agree to adjust the equal zation amount.
That further, the tax calculation is complicated and contentious. The ad ustment is
not automatic or set in stone as Susan urges on page 21 0
he brief.
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since it is a contract not incorporated in the Decree.

Keeler v.

Keeler, 131 Idaho 442, 958 P.2d 599 (Ct. App. 1998); see Foster v.

139 Idaho 563,

Schorr,

supra.

16

82 P.3d 845

(2003)

and Borley v.

Smith,

A party claiming breach must sue for breach or specific

performance in the proper court and the power of contempt is nonexistent since a non-merged contract is not a court order.
In order to harmonize the language in Borley found at p. 178
with prior case law that the Magistrate had jurisdiction to enforce
the terms of an agreement that was not merged in the Decree, such
could

be

performance

done
or

in

separate

a

breach.

jurisdictional amount,

While

contract
normally,

action

for

depending

specific
upon

that may occur in the District Court,

the
the

Supreme Court treated the action before the divorce court as having
equivalent jurisdiction to do so.
Contrary to Susan's claim the that adjustment she sought was
mandatory,

Mike

is

still

obligated

for

the

tax

and

what

tax

planning he will take, as has been taken each year in the past, to
defer the tax does not change the fact that it reduces the value of

16 Perhaps over-broadly,
the Supreme Court in Barley stated that the Magistrate
may have the right to enforce the terms of a non-merged agreement, but that may be
contrary to the rule that such an aggrieved party mus sue in a
rate action for
breach of the non-merged agreement or [or specif
performance of a non-merged
property settlement agreement.
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the dairy by the actual amount of the $1,006,000 tax on October 13,
2009, which tax the community has previously rolled year and after
year into the next year. Tr., Vol.

I of II, May 12, 2010, p.

70.

In short, the tax amount does not go away.

Borley v. Smith r supra, does not create for Susan the right to
remake her Motion to Petition the Court to Address Adjustments into
a Motion to enforce the decree, as it would require, if she did not
revisi t

the

Decree

Rule

under

60

I. R. C. P. ,

a

new

action

for

Contempt or otherwise.
Susan argues that Mike should have brought a Motion to Modify
the Judgment and Decree, but since Mike did not take exception to
the Judgment and Decree,

and more specifically the tax liability

finding of $1,006,000, no Motion was required.

The testimony of

both accountants on May 12, 2010, was caused by Susan's Affidavit
filed

April

attacking the

23,

2010,

tax

and

her

Memorandum

of

April

26,

2010,

liability finding and her obstruction of the

Citizens loan closing.

R.

p.

911-918,

949,

880.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing Arguments and the standard of review,
the

District

Court

Decision

should

be

affirmed

should be awarded his costs and attorneys fees
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and

Respondent

incurred in this

Appeal.

Susan failed to timely file her appeal and the District

Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the same.
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